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Antibiotics are valuable drugs that fight bacterial infections, but our supply of antibiotics is at 
risk.  Existing antibiotics gradually lose their effectiveness due to bacterial resistance, and few 
new antibiotics are being developed to replace them.  A variety of models have been proposed to 
promote the conservation of existing antibiotics or incentivize private actors, i.e., drug 
companies, to develop new ones.  Previous models, however, all encourage investment in 
antibiotic research and development via patent rights, which also create an incentive to oversell 
antibiotics.  Because the inappropriate use of antibiotics accelerates the development of 
resistance, patent rights put the public health objectives of antibiotic development and 
conservation in tension with one another.  This article proposes an antibiotic-specific patent prize 
system that uncouples the two policy objectives necessary to achieve a stable antibiotic supply.  
Although others have proposed patent prize systems to promote drug development generally, the 
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I.  Introduction 
 The discovery of antibiotics in the middle part of the twentieth century revolutionized 
modern medicine.  The medical use of antibiotics turned many bacterial infections from grave 
diagnoses into manageable conditions and made possible a variety of advanced interventions, 
such as surgery and cancer treatment.1  However, the use of an antibiotic to treat bacterial 
infections triggers a Darwinian selection among the microbial population for strains of the 
pathogen that are resistant to that antibiotic.2  Thus, as the use of the antibiotic increases, so does 
resistance to the antibiotic among the bacterial population, thereby undermining the effectiveness 
of the antibiotic.  Consequently, prevention of human mortality and morbidity resulting from 
bacterial infections requires coordinated efforts aimed at three interdependent goals:  
development of new antibiotics, conservation of existing antibiotics, and control of infection 
outbreaks.3 
Pharmaceutical companies have veered away from development of new antibiotics over 
the last few decades because other drugs are more profitable for several reasons.4  According to 
one group of commentators, antibiotics do not give developers a favorable return on their 
investment because the health care market vastly undervalues this class of drugs.5  In addition, 
the availability of generic antibiotics that are still effective against many bacterial infections 
leads public health authorities to relegate new antibiotics to a second (or later) line of defense 
against these pathogens.6  The likelihood that new antibiotics will be prescribed sparingly during 
                                                 
1 See Antibiotic Resistance: Promoting Critically Needed Antibiotic Research and Development and the Appropriate 
Use (“Stewardship”) of these Precious Drugs:  Hearing Before the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce 
Subcomm. on Health, 111th Cong. 4-6 (2010) [hereinafter Antibiotic Hearing] (statement of Brad Spellberg, 
Infectious Diseases Society of America). 
2 Marc Lipsitch, The Rise and Fall of Antimicrobial Resistance, 9 TRENDS IN MICROBIOLOGY 438, 441-42 (2001). 
3 See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Kevin Outterson, Improving Antibiotic Markets for Long-Term Sustainability, 11 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 101 (2011). 
4 Steven J. Projan, Why is big Pharma getting out of antibacterial drug discovery?, 6 CURRENT OPINION IN 
MICROBIOLOGY 427, 428 (2003).  
5 Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 4, at 150-53. 
6 Chantal Morel & Elias Mossialos, Stoking the Antibiotic Pipeline, 340 BRIT. MED. J. 1115, 1115 (2010). 
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their period of patent protection undermines the financial incentive for companies to develop 
them.7  Moreover, drug makers may fear that resistance will impair sales of a new antibiotic.8  
Finally, the uncertainty of obtaining the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) approval 
for a new antibiotic thwarts some pharmaceutical companies from entering the antibiotic field.9   
 Efforts to conserve antibiotic effectiveness and control outbreaks of infection face a 
different set of obstacles.  First, measures that seek to limit the use of a particular antibiotic to 
medically necessary indications place the interests of public health squarely in opposition to 
those of drug manufacturers.10  Consequently, the pharmaceutical industry has vehemently 
fought formulary restrictions that would promote antibiotic conservation.11  A second incentive 
problem is that infection control measures, such as screening patients for infectious pathogens 
and isolating infected patients in special wards, may go unrewarded.12  Individual hospitals that 
implement such preventative measures can reduce their use of antibiotics but may not be 
reimbursed for these activities by insurance companies.13  In addition, the coordination of 
infection control programs between hospitals in a local area could also help prevent the spread of 
pathogens and dampen the use of antibiotics.14  However, there are also limited financial 
incentives for regional cooperation among health care institutions are lacking.15 
 
II.  Existing Models to Promote Antibiotic Development and Conservation 
Within the last decade, several commentators have proposed a variety of models to 
                                                 
7 Kevin Outterson et al., Will Longer Antimicrobial Patents Improve General Global Public Health?, 7 LANCET 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 559, 564 (2007); Brad Spellberg et al., The Epidemic of Antibiotic-Resistant Infections: A 
Call to Action for the Medical Community from the Infectious Diseases Society of America, 46 CLINICAL 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 155, 158 (2008). 
8 Morel & Mossialos, supra note 7, at 1115. 
9 Id.  at 1116. 
10 See Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 4, at 126. 
11 Id.   
12 See id. at 124-26. 
13 Id. at 126.  
14 Kevin Outterson, The Legal Ecology of Resistance: The Role of Antibiotic Resistance in Pharmaceutical 
Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 613, 633 (2010). 
15 Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 4, at 127.  
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address the potential antibiotic shortage.16  Analysts have used different schemes for classifying 
these proposals based on three key elements.  The first element used for classification is the legal 
mechanism that the proposal seeks to employ.17  One group of commentators has identified four 
“primary legal tools” that most proposals use:  property, regulation, contract, and tort.18  Another 
element that serves as a basis for classifying proposals to promote long-term antibiotic 
effectiveness is the intermediate policy goal of the proposal:  antibiotic production or antibiotic 
conservation.19  The third element that analysts use to categorize antibiotic proposals is the type 
of incentive upon which the proposal relies:  “push” or “pull.”20  “[P]ush incentives pay for 
research inputs, funding or rewarding research and development (R&D) effort ex ante, i.e. 
irrespective of the outcome, and pull incentives pay for research outputs, rewarding R&D effort 
ex post, if the outputs of R&D result in a health gain.”21  For organizational simplicity, these 
proposals are categorized here according to legal mechanism (element one), but other elements 
of the proposals, i.e., policy goals and types of incentive, are discussed as relevant.22   
A.  PROPERTY-BASED MODELS 
1.  Patent term extensions.   
One property-based proposal to combat antibiotic shortage is to extend patent terms to 
give patent holders a longer period of exclusive rights.23  In its most basic form, a patent term 
extension (PTE) provides the holder of a patent for a new antibiotic with an additional period of 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., Elias Mossialos et al., Policies and Incentives for Promoting Innovation in Antibiotic Research, 
EUROPEAN OBSERVATORY ON HEALTH SYSTEMS & POLICIES (2010), available at 
http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/120143/E94241.pdf;  Priya Sharma & Adrian Towse, New 
Drugs to Tackle Antimicrobial Resistance: Analysis of EU Policy Options, UNITED KINGDOM OFFICE OF HEALTH 
ECONOMICS (2011), available at http://ohe.org/publications/article/new-drugs-to-tackle-antimicrobial-resistance-
5.cfm.  
17 Outterson, supra note 15, at 633. 
18 Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 4, at 107. 
19 Id.  
20 See Mossialos et al., supra note 17; Sharma & Towse, supra note 17. 
21 Sharma & Towse, supra note 17, at 30. 
22 None of the proposals discussed in this note rely on tort-based mechanisms.  For a discussion of tort-based models 
to combat antibiotic resistance, see Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 4. 
23 See, e.g., Eric Kades, Preserving a Precious Resource: Rationalizing the Use of Antibiotics, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 
611 (2005). 
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market exclusivity.24  Commentators typically view PTEs as pull incentives because PTEs 
increase the size of the reward for development of a new antibiotic.  Because antibiotic markets 
are not lucrative, however, the marginal increase in value of an extended antibiotic patent term is 
unlikely to attract drug companies’ interest.25  Consequently, many commentators have proposed 
a variation of the PTE in which the extended rights are transferable to any patented drug and 
exchangeable between parties.26  A so-called “wildcard” PTE has the potential for high 
profitability and may therefore have a shorter duration than a PTE linked to sales of the new 
antibiotic. 27   Some commentators believe that extensions of six months to two years are 
appropriate.28  The financial appeal of a wildcard PTE is significant:  a six-month PTE on 
Lipitor, the top-earning drug in the United States, was recently estimated to be worth over $3 
billion.29 
Critics believe that PTEs are not the right solution to a potential antibiotic shortage for a 
variety of reasons.  One criticism centers on the public cost that PTEs impose by extending 
patent monopolies and delaying entry of generic drugs into the largest markets.30  By one 
estimate, the cost to the public of a two-year wildcard PTE is approximately $10 billion, whereas 
the pharmaceutical industry estimates that the private cost of developing a new antibiotic is 
approximately $800 million.31  PTE advocates argue, however, that shortening the extension to 
six months would decrease the public cost by 75% to $2.5 billion.32  Moreover, a critic of PTEs 
                                                 
24 See Infectious Diseases Society of America, Bad Bugs, No Drugs: As Antibiotic Discovery Stagnates . . . A Public 
Health Crisis Brews, INFECTIOUS DISEASES SOCIETY OF AMERICA 26 (July 2004), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/04s0233/04s-0233-c000005-03-IDSA-vol1.pdf.  
25 Sharma & Towse, supra note 17, at 35-36. 
26 See, e.g., Jorn Sonderholm, Wild-Card Patent Extensions as a Means to Incentivize Research and Development of 
Antibiotics, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 240 (2009); Spellberg, supra note 8, at 161. 
27 Sharma & Towse, supra note 17, at 40-42. 
28 Id. at 38. 
29 Sonderholm, supra note 27, at 241. 
30 See id.   
31 Id.; Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH 
ECON., 151, 166 (2003). 
32 Kevin Outterson et al., Will Longer Antimicrobial Patents Improve General Global Public Health?, 7 LANCET 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 559, 561 (2007); Sonderholm, supra note 27, at 242. 
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concedes that “the market undervalues antibiotics”33 and has proposed, as part of an alternative 
model to promote antibiotic effectiveness, “a very substantial increase in payments for 
antibiotics.”34  Thus, without a realistic estimate of the value of a new antibiotic, it is uncertain 
whether PTEs for new antibiotics impose an unduly high public cost. 
A related criticism of wildcard PTEs is that they unfairly transfer the cost of developing a 
new antibiotic onto another group of patients with an unrelated ailment.35  According to this 
critique, the small segment of the population that must continue to pay monopoly drug prices due 
to the transferred extension bears the cost of providing a new antibiotic for everyone.36  
Advocates counter that patients who need the drug to which the wildcard PTE is transferred will 
not disproportionately bear the cost of antibiotic development for two reasons:  most patients 
have health insurance, and those who do not are still able to receive public health care.37  
Consequently, the general public will ultimately pay for the antibiotic via health insurance rates 
and taxes.38 
Other criticisms of PTEs are more difficult to rebut.  One is that the reward conferred by 
wildcard PTEs for the discovery of a new antibiotic is essentially arbitrary.39  With wildcard 
PTEs, the reward for a new antibiotic depends largely on factors such as timing that have no 
relation to the value of the antibiotic.  For example, an early developer of a relatively modest 
antibiotic may receive a huge reward by selling its PTE to the owner of a blockbuster that is 
about to lose patent protection. A later developer of a truly innovative antibiotic may receive a 
much smaller reward because no blockbusters with expiring patents are available at that time.40  
                                                 
33 Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 4, at 150.  
34 Id. at 152. 
35 Outterson et al., supra note 33, at 562. 
36 Id.  The authors posit that a PTE for a new antibiotic would likely be transferred to the cholesterol-lowering drug 
Lipitor and therefore call wildcard PTEs “a hidden tax on heart disease.” 
37 Sonderholm, supra note 27, at 243. 
38 Id.  This argument has become more compelling since the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act of 2009, which requires all individuals to have health insurance. 
39 Id.  
40 Outterson et al., supra note 33, at 562. 
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A related concern is that wildcard PTEs may trigger patent races in which developers invest 
large sums to be the first to deliver a new antibiotic.41  The costs of research and development in 
such races “overwhelm the social value of obtaining the [new antibiotic] a day or a month 
sooner.”42 
2.  Government-based antibiotic development.   
Another property-based model to promote antibiotic development and conservation is to 
charge the government with these duties.43   According to this proposal, the government not only 
funds early-stage antibiotic discovery but “also perform[s] later-stage development and clinical 
testing, so that it can develop antibiotics itself.”44  Whereas PTEs create stronger property rights 
for antibiotics, this model eliminates antibiotic property rights entirely.  This model also entails a 
role for the government in antibiotic conservation via regulation.45  The primary criticism of this 
model is that the government lacks the expertise and experience to develop new antibiotics.46  As 
one analyst points out, “No government has successfully discovered and developed an antibiotic, 
and it is unlikely that any public body would have the resources or technical ability to do this.”47   
B.  REGULATION-BASED MODELS 
1.  Tax credits.   
Regulation-based models for antibiotic development and conservation, compared to the 
government-only approach described supra Part IIA, envision a more modest, but still expanded, 
role for the government.  One such model is to award tax credits to companies that invest in 
                                                 
41 Amy Kapczynski, Innovation Policy for a New Era, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 264, 266 (2009). 
42 Id.  
43 Jessica P. Schulman, Patents and Public Health: The Problems with Using Patent Law Proposals to Combat 
Antibiotic Resistance, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 221, 254 (2009). 
44 Id.  
45 See id. at 252 (stating that “[t]he best way to both slow the spread of antibiotic resistance and effectively use 
existing antibiotics involves closely regulating antibiotic use . . . .”). 
46 E. Power, Impact of Antibiotic Restrictions: The Pharmaceutical Perspective, 12 CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY AND 
INFECTION (Supp. 5) 25, 30 (2006), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1469-
0691.2006.01528.x/abstract. 
47 Id.  
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antibiotic research and development.48  Tax credits operate as push incentives by reducing the 
barrier to entry into antibiotic markets.  Tax credits relieve a company of some percentage of the 
tax burden on its revenues and are therefore attractive to large firms that already have products 
on the market.49  However, mechanisms exist to make tax credits more attractive to smaller 
companies.  For example, the tax credit can be transferable or even redeemable as a cash refund 
for a company with low tax bills.50  Advocates contend that tax credits introduce fewer market 
distortions than other mechanisms that require direct government intervention and therefore 
result in lower transactional costs.51  The Orphan Drug Act (ODA), which sought to incentivize 
drug companies to develop drugs with weak market appeal, includes a tax credit, among other 
incentives.52  Analysts believe that the tax credit has contributed to the ODA’s success at 
spurring drug companies, including smaller ones, to develop new drugs for unmet medical 
needs.53  The Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) also publicly endorsed tax credits 
for antibiotic research and development.54 
Analysts have raised several criticisms of tax credits.  First, as with any push incentive, a 
tax credit does not guarantee the delivery of a new product.55  Second, some commentators 
consider tax credits to be expensive gifts to developers because the public already pays for 
innovation through patent-protected monopolies.56  Third, companies seeking tax credits may 
“employ[] creative accounting” in reporting their investments.57  Thus, tax credits require the 
government to monitor companies closely, and the increased administrative costs may offset the 
                                                 
48 Carl Nathan & Frederick M. Goldberg, The Profit Problem in Antibiotic R & D, 4 NATURE R. DRUG DISCOVERY 
887, 890 (2005). 
49 Sharma & Towse, supra note 17, at 40. 
50 Mossialos et al., supra note 17, at 79.  
51 Id. at 81. 
52 26 U.S.C. § 45C (2006). 
53 Sharma & Towse, supra note 17, at 41. 
54 Spellberg, supra note 8, at 160. 
55 Mossialos et al., supra note 17, at 81. 
56 See id. (stating that “governments pay twice for elements of innovation.”). 
57 Id.   
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savings in transactional costs.58 
2.  Expedited regulatory review.   
Another regulatory mechanism that could promote antibiotic development is expedited 
regulatory review.  The fast-track option (FTO) is the mechanism of expedited regulatory review 
that has the greatest potential for impact on antibiotic development.  The FTO mechanism entails 
consultation between the FDA and drug sponsor to make both the clinical and regulatory 
approval phases of development more efficient.59  The FTO process could shorten the time 
required to get a drug approved by as much as three years.60  Although an FTO could be applied 
directly to development of a new antibiotic, the FDA can best capture its value by selling the 
FTO to a company that applies the FTO to the drug of its choice.  For example, a recent study 
modeled the hypothetical value of purchasing an FTO for Prozac that would have expedited the 
approval process by two years and found that it would have been worth between $500-750 
million.61   
The FTO can operate as either a push or pull incentive.62  One commentator has proposed 
the use of FTOs by the European Medicines Agency (EMA), the counterpart to the FDA, as a 
push mechanism to raise money for research on neglected diseases.63  According to this model, 
the EMA auctions an FTO to the highest bidder and uses the resulting funds to support research 
and development on neglected diseases.64  Alternatively, others have suggested the use of FTOs 
as a pull incentive by awarding an FTO to a company that brings a new antibiotic to market.65  A 
                                                 
58 Id.   
59 Mary Moran, Fast Track Options as a Fundraising Mechanism to Support R & D into Neglected Diseases, 
PHARM. R&D POL’Y PROJECT LONDON SCHOOL OF ECON. 2-3 (2005), available at 
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/submissions/Mary.Moran2.pdf. 
60 Id. at 4. 
61 Id. at 12.  Modeling assumed that FTO was purchased five years prior to approval.  Applying FTO to new drug 
candidate carries the risk that candidate will not get approval, so the modeling included alternative calculations 
based on assumptions that either Prozac was certain to get approved (no risk) or that risk could be estimated.  
Assumption of no risk produced value of $761 million, and estimation of risk produced value of $521 million. 
62 Sharma & Towse, supra note 17, at 31. 
63 See Moran, supra note 60, at 2-6. 
64 Id. at 4-6. 
65 Sharma & Towse, supra note 17, at 31. 
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premise of this model is that the FTO is transferable so that any company can realize the value of 
the FTO, regardless of whether the company has its own blockbuster.66 
 The potential sale of fast-track review by the FDA to raise money for antibiotic 
development triggers three concerns.  Foremost is whether the expedited clinical and regulatory 
review would result in bringing unsafe drugs to market.67  Defenders argue that even if expedited 
review creates increased risk, FTOs would produce a net health gain:  the benefit of having a 
new antibiotic would more than offset the safety costs of bringing a second drug to market via 
expedited review.68  A second concern is the societal cost of effectively extending monopoly 
pricing of the drug to which the FTO transferred.69  Like a wildcard PTE, the transferable FTO 
could be viewed as a tax on patients suffering from a specific disease (treated by the fast-tracked 
drug) to pay for antibiotics for everyone.70  However, the same counterargument for PTEs 
applies to FTOs:  the increased costs of the blockbuster are ultimately distributed to the public 
through health insurance rates and taxes.71 
3.  Changes in FDA approval guidelines.   
Another proposed regulatory mechanism to facilitate delivery of new antibiotics is to 
simplify the regulatory review process to obtain FDA approval of antibiotics.72  One 
recommendation is to increase FDA guidance to drug developers about the types of clinical 
studies and evidence required to prove safety and efficacy of a new antibiotic.73  For example, 
the FDA has made several changes to the standard of non-inferiority, including both relaxation 
and clarification, over the last twenty years.74  The lack of certainty in the standard for approval 
                                                 
66 Id.  
67 Id.  at 33.  
68 Tomas J. Philipson et al., Assessing the Safety and Efficacy of the FDA: The Case of the Prescription Drug User 
Fee Acts, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH 8-16 (2005), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11724.pdf?new_window=1. 
69 Sharma & Towse, supra note 17, at 33. 
70 See Outterson et al., supra note 33, at 562. 
71 See Sonderholm, supra note 27, at 243. 
72 Mossialos et al., supra note 17, at 152;  Power, supra note 47, at 28-29. 
73 Spellberg, supra note 8, at 158. 
74 For a description of changes in the FDA’s standard of non-inferiority, see Power supra note 47, at 28-29. 
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may dissuade potential antibiotic developers, who could face large unanticipated increases in 
costs after they are far along in the development process.75 Consequently, some commentators 
“strongly recommen[d] that further progress be made towards providing developers with clear 
and consistent guidance for trials for relevant indications.”76   
Critics fear that relaxing or simplifying FDA guidelines for antibiotic approval could 
have a net negative effect on public health.  Loosening the regulatory requirements for new 
antibiotics could assist the fight against infectious diseases, but would likely result in an increase 
in adverse side effects that may outweigh the benefits.77  Significantly, more than half of the 
antibiotics approved by the FDA from 1980-2000 were subsequently removed from the market, 
many of them due to safety concerns; relaxation of standards for approval would likely 
exacerbate this problem.78  Clarification of FDA standards for antibiotic approval also carries 
risk.  Firm, clear guidelines intended to facilitate approval of antibiotics may have the opposite 
effect.  For example, when an indication for an antibiotic is defined narrowly, the developer may 
have difficulty obtaining a sufficient number of patients for a clinical study, resulting in delayed 
approval of a much-needed antibiotic. The market introduction of daptomycin illustrates this 
point.79  Thus, bright-line rules for antibiotic approval may deprive the agency of the discretion it 
needs to approve important new antibiotics like daptomycin. 
4.  Waiver of antitrust laws.   
Another regulatory mechanism to secure the antibiotic supply is to grant a limited waiver 
of antitrust laws to allow companies to coordinate sales of antibiotics.80  Whereas most of the 
models discussed here incentivize antibiotic development, this proposal focuses primarily on 
                                                 
75 Id. at 29. 
76 Mossialos et al., supra note 17, at 152. 
77 See Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 4, at 145-46. 
78 Id.  at 146. 
79 For a description of daptomycin’s path to approval, see Helen W. Boucher, Challenges in Anti-Infective 
Development in the Era of Bad Bugs, No Drugs: A Regulatory Perspective Using the Example of Bloodstream 
Infection as an Indication, 50 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES (Supp. 1) S4, S5-S8 (2010). 
80 Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 4, at 157. 
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antibiotic conservation.  The basis for this proposal is that the biological mechanisms of 
antibiotic resistance often confer broad resistance to an entire class of antibiotics, so producers of 
different antibiotics within a given class may need to act collectively to stave off resistance.81  
According to this proposal, the FDA identifies combinations of antibiotics and infectious 
bacteria for which cross-resistance is a problem.82  The FDA then issues certificates to the patent 
holders of the antibiotics in a given class that immunize these companies from antitrust 
prosecution as long as they meet specified conservation goals.83  The proposal also contemplates 
PTEs as potentially necessary to prevent generic producers from entering the market and 
interfering with conservation efforts.84 
Implementation of antitrust waivers for antibiotic classes to promote antibiotic 
conservation poses two challenges.  First, coordinated sales between drug companies can only 
preserve antibiotic effectiveness if other stakeholders commit to the effort as well.85  Hospitals, 
physicians, and other health care providers must be willing to change their practices in using 
antibiotics.86  Thus, promoting antibiotic conservation would require not only horizontal 
coordination among competing suppliers but also vertical coordination among actors at different 
levels in the supply chain.87  Advocates of antitrust waivers point out that both types of 
transactions may need protection from antitrust laws.88  Second, the success of antibiotic 
conservation through coordinated sales within antibiotic classes depends on the strength of the 
science upon which the classification relies.  Mechanisms of resistance to a new antibiotic may 
be unknown; consequently, an antibiotic initially believed to be an orphan may later be identified 
as a member of a pre-existing class.  Unchecked marketing of a single antibiotic from a 
                                                 
81 Id.  at 157-58. 
82 Id.  at 158. 
83 Id.   
84 Id.  
85 Id.  at 159.  
86 Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 4, at 159.   
87 Id.   
88 Id.  at 157-59. 
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resistance class could undermine the conservation efforts of a host of other companies and curtail 
their financial rewards. 
C.  CONTRACT-BASED MODELS 
1.  Direct funding of research.   
The largest category of proposals to combat an antibiotic shortage comprises models that 
rely on contractual arrangements with the government.  One contract-based push incentive that 
has long been used to stimulate antibiotic research and development is direct government 
funding of antibiotic-related research.  The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases 
(NIAID) is the main body that funds research on infectious diseases in the United States.89  In 
2007, the NIAID invested approximately $800 million in antimicrobial research (including study 
of both bacterial and viral pathogens), about $200 million of which was dedicated to the study of 
antimicrobial resistance.90  This funding primarily supports academic institutions and intramural 
programs, although private companies receive some of this money through product development 
partnerships (PDPs, see infra Part II.C.4).  For example, Project Bioshield allocated $5.6 billion 
over a ten-year period for research on antibiotics that could be used as defenses against acts of 
bioterrorism.91  More recently, the IDSA recommended increased grant funding for antibiotic 
research generally to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.92 
Few proposals to solve the potential antibiotic shortage rely on direct research funding 
because it suffers from a variety of problems.  One weakness is that the information asymmetry 
between the funding agency and researcher may cause the latter to exaggerate the promise of a 
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drug candidate.93  Government bodies may not be qualified to assess the viability of grant 
applications and may therefore misallocate resources.94  Another potential problem is that direct 
government funding may lack the long-term stability needed to support ongoing antibiotic 
development due to political variables.95  As one group put it, “government funding is often set 
on an annual basis and is thus dependent on the individuals in power, the economic climate, and 
other perpetually changing factors.”96  The apprehension of funding instability may, however, be 
overwrought.  For example, annual funding for antimicrobial research rose steadily over the ten-
year period from 1998-2007.97  A third concern, common to all push incentives, is the lack of 
incentive to deliver a final product.98  As one group of analysts points out, a developer who 
receives an upfront payment “may lack the motivation to continue development once [it has] 
reached the end of the push funding.”99 
2.  Advance purchase commitments.    
Another contract-based mechanism to stimulate antibiotic development is the advanced 
purchase commitment (APC), which is also called the advanced market commitment.  An APC is 
a promise by the government to purchase a fixed quantity of an antibiotic that meets certain 
specifications at a price attractive to drug developers.100  One predicate of success for an APC is 
the developer’s agreement to continue to sell the antibiotic at a reasonable price once the APC 
has expired.101  The IDSA has advocated for APCs as one component of a multidimensional 
proposal to stimulate antibiotic development.102 
APCs face several barriers to implementation.  The first is the difficulty of determining 
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the size and price of the APC:  too small a purchase fails to provide adequate incentive for drug 
developers, whereas too large a purchase risks wasting government resources.103  A second 
problem is deciding whether the APC should be awarded only to the first developer of an 
antibiotic in a given class or be split among multiple companies that have developed antibiotics 
with similar characteristics at approximately the same time.104  The former approach would offer 
no reward for a later-developed antibiotic that might have advantageous properties compared to 
the pioneer of that class, a common scenario in antibiotic development.105  The latter strategy, 
however, could be difficult to administer and would make the incentive smaller and less 
certain.106  Another problem, common to all pull incentives that rely on direct government 
payments, is the political hurdle of securing a firm commitment from the government to pay for 
a future product that may never be delivered.  A recent estimate indicates that a commitment of 
$2.3 billion would be required to provide adequate incentive for development of a new 
antibiotic.107  Moreover, enacting legislation to allocate funds to buy as-yet undeveloped 
antibiotics may be the most difficult political step in implementing an APC, but it would not be 
the last.  Due to the length of time required to develop a new drug, the credibility of an APC to 
prospective developers would depend on a stable, ongoing commitment from the government.108  
“One could envision government budgetary pressures combined with the appearance of windfall 
profits . . . leading to a downward spiral in prices.”109  
3.  Prizes.   
A third contract-based model for stimulating antibiotic development is for the 
government to offer monetary prizes for new antibiotics.  Prize systems for approved new 
antibiotics can take three forms.  In the first form, the prize system replaces patent rights 
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altogether.110  Senator Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) has proposed such a prize model for drugs to treat 
neglected disease in three Congressional bills:  the Medical Prize Innovation Act of 2005, the 
Medical Prize Innovation Act of 2007, and the Medical Prize Fund Innovation Act of 2011.111  In 
this model, the developer of a new drug is entitled to a large cash reward but may not receive 
intellectual property protection for the pharmaceutical.112  The size of the award depends on 
several factors, such as the health impact of the drug, its incremental benefit over existing 
medicines, and whether development of the new drug is based on previous innovations.113  The 
second type of prize system offers a smaller reward for the first company to market a new 
antibiotic but allows the developer to retain patent rights.114  This option provides a strong 
incentive for developers to reach the market quickly and places a smaller financial burden on the 
government.115  The third form is an optional prize system in which the developer can choose 
between receiving a reward and obtaining patent rights.116  The Health Impact Fund (HIF) is a 
proposal for an optional international prize fund for drugs to treat neglected diseases.117   
Each type of prize system has its drawbacks.  The major obstacle for a mandatory prize 
system, as evidenced by the fate of the Sanders’ MIPFA bills, is the political unattractiveness of 
its high cost.  The cost of the Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act (MIPFA), the 2011 Sanders’ 
bill, was $80 billion, 0.55% of the gross domestic product.118  Voters and legislators may be 
hesitant to earmark such large sums for future payouts, and pharmaceutical companies might 
balk at relinquishing their patent rights.  Another potential problem of a mandatory prize system 
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in which private companies forego patent rights is that the lack of monopoly control would lead 
to higher sales.  An antibiotic priced at its marginal cost from the moment it hits the market 
would face a higher consumer demand, which would accelerate the development of resistance 
and shorten the effective lifespan of the antibiotic.119  In contrast, the primary criticism of a prize 
system in which private patent rights are retained is that the public has to pay for the new 
antibiotic twice:  once through taxes for the prize, and a second time through the market for 
monopoly prices.120  Finally, the optional prize system has been attacked for its inefficiency in 
the context of drug development generally.121  According to one analyst, companies will only opt 
for the reward if they believe that the government is willing to pay more for a drug than it is 
worth, so the public will always end up overpaying.122  As discussed supra Part I, however, some 
commentators believe that the market undervalues antibiotics both for their primary patient 
benefits and for their positive secondary health effects.123  Consequently, this concern may not 
apply to antibiotics. 
4.  Publicly-sponsored early-stage research collaborations.   
Another category of contractual models to promote antibiotic development comprises 
various research collaborations between public and private entities.  The goal of such proposals 
is to better integrate different phases of antibiotic research that have traditionally occurred in 
separate spheres:  fundamental scientific discoveries in academia, and development of drug 
candidates in biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies.124  Public-private partnerships 
(PPPs), also called product development partnerships (PDPs), have been a critical step in this 
direction.125  PPPs are contractual research collaborations between publicly-funded research 
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organizations and private pharmaceutical companies.126  Although PPPs vary widely in form, 
they are typically formed when a public organization has identified a promising drug candidate 
in its discovery research and seeks a private partner to develop the compound.127  In the 
partnership, the public partner provides the funding, and the private partner contributes expertise 
in drug development.128   
Another proposed collaborative model is the “open-access drug company.”129  According 
to one commentator, optimal drug development requires ongoing interaction between scientists 
doing discovery-phase research and those involved in later stages of development; the exchange 
of information and resources between the two groups makes the entire process more efficient.130  
PPPs, however, limit the interaction between the early-stage and late-stage scientists, resulting in 
an “unnecessarily small number of what are likely to be suboptimal lead compounds.”131  An 
alternative is the open-access drug company, a more stable and integrated organization that 
allows free interaction among all interested parties from the outset.132  In such an arrangement, 
private drug companies provide information, certain proprietary materials (e.g., chemical 
libraries), and research space to government-funded academic scientists for a fee.133  The private 
partner in the open access company benefits from the results of custom-tailored drug discovery 
research but foregoes patent rights.134  The government or other public funding agency retains a 
limited set of rights to any newly-discovered compounds through a “track II” patent, another 
novel feature of this model.135  In contrast to a traditional patent (“track I” under this model), a 
track II patent would not confer the right to exclude others from selling the drug; instead, a track 
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II patent would entitle its owner to receive periodic payments based on the health impact of the 
drug.136 
The main concerns regarding early-stage research collaborations derive from the potential 
for misalignment of incentives of the different parties.  First, PPPs create unique governance 
problems that result from goals of the constituent organizations that are not always shared.137  
Analysts have identified a number of issues that contribute to poor governance of PPPs:  failure 
to specify partners’ roles and responsibilities, inadequate monitoring of performance, insufficient 
oversight in partner selection and management of conflicts of interest, and lack of transparency 
in decision-making.138  A second problem is the information asymmetry at the time of PPP 
formation.139  According to some commentators, a scientist with a drug candidate looking to 
form a PPP “knows far more about the product’s likelihood of success [than do the industrial 
scientists with whom he would like to collaborate] and may be prone to over-emphasize its 
potential.”140  For open-access drug companies, a potential conflict exists between the scientists 
who develop the patented drugs and the funders to whom the inventors obligatorily contract their 
patent rights.141  Because the interests of various stakeholders may be incompatible, some 
analysts believe it is unclear “[a]t what stage they will compete and at what stage they will 
collaborate.”142 
5.  Reimbursement.   
Another contract-based model to promote antibiotic development and conservation is for 
government agencies to increase insurance reimbursement for antibiotics.  Again, as discussed 
supra Part I, some commentators believe that the market undervalues antibiotics compared to 
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their social value.143  To correct this market flaw, they propose that a government agency aided 
by experts from Medicare choose an appropriate system for calculating the social value of 
antibiotics and adjust insurance reimbursement rates accordingly.144  So-called “value-based 
reimbursement” would cause antibiotic prices to rise substantially, likely resulting in a 
simultaneous increase in sales revenue and decrease in sales volume.145  Thus, value-based 
reimbursement could incentivize both development of new antibiotics and conservation of 
existing ones.146 
The primary concern with value-based reimbursement is the choice of metric for 
calculating the appropriate price for antibiotics.147  Advocates of value-based reimbursement 
recommend using disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) as a measure for social value, although 
quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) and other potential metrics exist.148  Others believe that 
development of an entirely new, “more holistic” system may be necessary.149  Even skeptics 
concede, however, that adoption of an imperfect metric until a better system is devised would 
help in the short term to lure developers into the antibiotic field.150 
 
III.  A New Model for Uncoupling Antibiotic Development from Sales (UADS) 
A.  OVERVIEW OF UADS MODEL 
In light of the strengths and weaknesses of these models to secure the future antibiotic 
supply, this article describes a system for uncoupling antibiotic development and sales (UADS).  
The UADS model incorporates ideas from several previous proposals into a system designed to 
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address the unique combination of problems that confront developers of antibiotics.  As the name 
suggests, the essential feature of this model is the uncoupling of antibiotic development from 
production and sales so that the incentives for antibiotic innovation and conservation are no 
longer misaligned.  Instead, development and sales occur in two separate phases by two different 
sets of actors.   
The motivating force in the development phase (phase one) of the UADS model is a 
patent buyout.151  In phase one, pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies and PPPs develop 
new antibiotics and seek patent protection for the new compounds, formulations, or methods of 
use.  To receive FDA approval for new antibiotics, developers must transfer their patent rights to 
the government in exchange for a substantial prize.  Because FDA approval is conditioned upon 
relinquishing patent rights, participation in the prize system is, for practical purposes, mandatory.  
In the patent buyout in phase one, new antibiotics are not released into the public domain by 
eliminating patent rights altogether; rather, the government retains the rights for use during the 
sales phase. 
The crux of the sales phase (phase two) is that the government licenses the patent rights 
to drug manufacturers to make and sell the antibiotics.  Although the same company could 
develop and produce a given drug, these two functions may also be performed by separate 
entities.  For example, innovative biotechnology companies and pharmaceutical firms with 
experience in clinical development may be the strongest competitors in the development phase.  
In the sales phase, however, companies that specialize in manufacturing generic drugs may excel 
due to their experience at adapting rapidly to production of new compounds.  The government 
also plays a critical role during the sales phase.  By retaining rights in all new antibiotics through 
mandatory participation of developers, the government is well-positioned to promote antibiotic 
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conservation.  An administrative body such as the FDA would be able to decide such issues as 
priority of antibiotic use and appropriateness of indications unencumbered by conflicting private 
interests. 
The UADS model is based on the prize system embodied in the MIPFA.152  As 
acknowledged in an earlier version of the bill, “[a]wards to companies . . . that reward successful 
product research can de-couple the reward for product research development from the price of 
the product.”153  However, some objectives of the UADS model differ from those of the MIPFA 
as a result of the differences in scope of the two proposals.  The MIPFA targets neglected 
diseases, whereas the UADS model focuses on bacterial infections. As discussed supra Part I, 
combating bacterial infections with antibiotics poses a special set of challenges.154  The declared 
purpose of the MIPFA is to enhance access to drugs by providing them to consumers at lower 
prices, but for antibiotics, both higher prices and decreased consumer access serve the public 
interest.155  The MIPFA recognized the unique dilemma that antibiotics pose, but the breadth of 
the bill precluded a detailed description of how to promote antibiotic conservation.156  Thus, 
phase two of the UADS model diverges from the vision of the MIPFA:  the MIPFA is designed 
to increase distribution of new drugs generally, including antibiotics, whereas phase two of the 
UADS seeks to limit and regulate distribution of new antibiotics specifically.157 
B.  FEATURES OF PHASE ONE 
1.  Mandatory participation.   
One element of the UADS model is that participation is mandatory for all developers of 
antibiotics.  As discussed supra Part II.C.3, others have proposed patent prize systems in which 
                                                 
152 Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act, S. 1137, 112th Cong. (2011).  For a detailed description of the prize system 
that gave rise to Medical Prize Innovation Act, see James Love & Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R 
& D for New Medicines, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1519 (2007). 
153 Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. § 2(9) (2007).  
154  Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act, S. 1137, 112th Cong. §§ (9)(c)(3)(C), 15(a)(2) (2011). 
155 Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act, S. 1137, 112th Cong, § 3 (2011).  See Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 3, 
at 150-53. 
156 Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act, S. 1137, 112th Cong. § 9(c)(6) (2011). 
157  Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act, S. 1137, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011). 
PGH. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y, Vol. 12, No. 5, Spring 2012                                                                                          23 
 
participation is optional for producers of drugs for neglected diseases.158  However, a system that 
makes participation mandatory has several advantages in the context of antibiotic development.  
First, the problem of cross-resistance to different antibiotics within a class makes it necessary for 
coordinated regulation of all antibiotics by a central administrative body.159  As discussed infra 
Part III.C.3, the actions of a single antibiotic producer that chooses not to participate in the 
conservation effort but instead, aggressively markets its drug could create elevated resistance to 
an entire antibiotic class.  Mandatory participation removes the possibility of misaligned 
incentives that create this negative externality.  Second, “[v]oluntary prize mechanisms would 
also be [more] expensive, since companies could opt for the larger sum between monopoly 
profits or the prizes.”160  In an optional system, a developer that knows it can receive a 
predictable return by registering for the prize can use that information to leverage a higher 
profitability from monopoly sales.  In effect, the developer could use the prize to bargain with 
the public, which would pay either directly for the prize or indirectly via insurance rates and 
reimbursement.  Making participation mandatory precludes developers from gaming the system 
in this way. 
Implementation of a mandatory participation program requires a plan for the transition 
from the current system of private rights.  The UADS model could adopt a transition plan similar 
in design to the one contained in the MIPFA.161  The MIPFA recommended distributing 90% of 
the prize fund to private patent holders during the first year and decreasing the allocation by 9% 
per year over a ten-year period.162  The balance of the fund that is not reserved for pre-existing 
private patent holders would be available for distribution to registrants of new drugs.  The 
MIPFA also placed a ceiling of 5% of the total annual fund value for any one drug registered 
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under the program.163  Thus, the MIPFA could award the maximum payment for up to two new 
drugs during the first transitional year, and this number would increase to twenty by the end of 
the ten-year transition period.  Optimizing the transition for the UADS model may require some 
adjustment of the transitional parameters.  For example, extending the transition period to fifteen 
or twenty years would mitigate the harm to current holders of antibiotic patents without 
adversely affecting the incentive for present and future developers.  Additionally, raising the 
maximum percentage of the fund allocated for a single new compound may be necessary.  The 
UADS model is narrower in scope than the MIPFA and would likely include a smaller number of 
drugs than the MIPFA anticipated.  Therefore, the possibility of having twenty or more 
antibiotics simultaneously registered under the UADS model seems remote, particularly during 
the transition period.164  In addition, the budget for the UADS model would be smaller than for 
the MIPFA.  Thus, raising the maximum award for an individual antibiotic above 5% of the total 
fund value might be appropriate for the UADS model. 
2.  Prize options.  
 Both the political viability and economic success of the UADS model depend on the size 
of the prize and how it is funded.  The prize must be large enough to attract potential developers 
to invest in development of a product for which the private market has been inadequate.  At the 
same time, the size of the outlay must not be politically unpalatable to voting constituencies who 
may already be skeptical of an unproven system.165  The mechanisms suggested here for funding 
and awarding prizes under the UADS proposal are taken directly from previous patent prize 
models for neglected diseases.166  The antibiotics market may provide an opportunity to test and 
perfect these ideas in a limited scope; a method that proves successful in the antibiotics arena 
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may convince skeptics of the method’s viability for a more expensive and expansive plan to 
cover neglected diseases generally.   
Funding the prizes.   
Funding for the UADS proposal would come from the federal budget.  Due to the length 
of time required for development of new drugs, the UADS model requires a funding 
commitment for an extended period.167  The international HIF, focusing on the contribution of 
payers, recommends that participating countries commit to funding for a period of twelve 
years.168  Viewed from the perspective of prize recipients, the MIPFA envisioned that a prize 
winner would be eligible for annual payments for a maximum of ten years.169  Based on these 
models, a funding period of 10-15 years would be appropriate for the UADS model.  Another 
question for the UADS model is whether the obligation of the payer (i.e., the federal 
government) or the expected payment to the prize recipient should be fixed.  Developers of the 
MIPFA advocate the latter system because it facilitates budget planning by the government.170  
Determination of the appropriate level of funding for the UADS program would be based on 
current national expenditures to treat bacterial diseases and foreseeable costs that would result 
from future antibiotic shortages.171 
Distributing the prizes.   
Several factors merit consideration in determining how to distribute UADS prizes.  The 
most critical concern is how to determine the size of the prize for an individual developer.  The 
HIF has a distribution model in which payment correlates directly to health impact (measured in 
                                                 
167 See Steven M. Paul et al., How to Improve R&D Productivity: The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Grand Challenge, 
9 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 203, 205 (2010) (discovery and development of a new drug takes an average 
of 13.5 years).   
168 HOLLIS & POGGE, supra note 118, at 10. 
169 Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act, S. 1137, 112th Cong. § 9(d)(3) (2011). 
170 Love & Hubbard, supra note 153, at 1536. 
171 An accurate estimate of these values would require calculations beyond the scope of this article, but it is worth 
noting that the level of funding required for the UADS model would be lower than the amount needed for either the 
HIF or MIPFA because the UADS model is narrower in scope:  the UADS model covers only antibiotics, whereas 
the HIF and MIPFA cover drugs for all neglected diseases.  Proposed funding levels for the HIF and MIPFA are 
0.03% of gross national income and 0.55% of gross domestic product, respectively.  HOLLIS & POGGE, supra note 
118, at 9; Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act, S. 1137, 112th Cong. § 17(a)(2) (2011). 
PGH. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y, Vol. 12, No. 5, Spring 2012                                                                                          26 
 
QALYs) of the new drug.172  Under UADS, however, the health impact of a new antibiotic may 
be impossible to measure accurately because the antibiotic may be held in reserve.  For example, 
an antibiotic may be “stockpiled” as a defensive measure to a potential bio-terrorism attack or 
saved as a replacement for a pre-existing antibiotic that has not yet succumbed to resistance.173  
The MIPFA acknowledged the public health benefit from holding antibiotics in reserve.174 
Therefore, a better fit for the UADS program is a flexible system that confers some level 
of discretion to administrators in determining the size of the prize.175  Such a system allows 
administrators to correct for various inequities that may result from application of a strictly 
proportional system, such as inadequate reward for antibiotics that have limited demand or are 
held in reserve.176  Developers of the MIPFA have described one embodiment of this system in 
which a fraction of the prize (e.g., half) is awarded in proportion to health impact of the drug and 
the remainder is distributed equally among registrants.177  Their hypothetical example illustrates 
how developers of drugs affecting smaller populations would have incentive to bring such drugs 
to market under a mixed proportional/discretionary prize distribution system but not under a 
directly proportional system.178   
A second, albeit related, consideration in distributing prizes under the UADS model is the 
timing of payments.  As mentioned supra, developers of new drugs under the MIPFA would 
receive annual payments for up to ten years.179  The payment over an extended period allows for 
a more accurate assessment of the health impact of a new drug.180  A similar payment scheme 
would be appropriate for the UADS model, although a ten-year window may still be too brief to 
                                                 
172 HOLLIS & POGGE, supra note 118, at 13-35.  
173 The UADS would have a measure akin to the stockpiling procedure of Project BioShield, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 
247d-6b, or the strategic antibiotic reserve of the Antibiotic Continued Effectiveness model, see Kesselheim & 
Outterson, supra note 4, at 160-61. 
174 See Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act, S. 1137, 112th Cong. § 9(c)(6) (2011). 
175 See Love & Hubbard, supra note 153, at 1537-39. 
176 Id.  
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179 Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act, S. 1137, 112th Cong. § 9(d)(3) (2011). 
180 Love & Hubbard, supra note 153, at 1539. 
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gauge the value of a new antibiotic.  However, protracting the payment period in the hope of 
discerning the health impact of certain antibiotics, i.e., those held in reserve, may be impractical.  
Thus, the UADS model cannot rely on the timing of payments alone to account for the value of 
antibiotics held in reserve. 
A third consideration in distributing prizes is how to apportion value, and therefore prize 
money, between first-in-class antibiotics and follow-on derivatives.  According to some 
commentators, one of the fundamental problems of the current patent system is that it encourages 
development of follow-on drugs over fundamentally new medicines.181  A follow-on drug with 
superior clinical properties to the pioneering drug typically requires much less investment in 
research and development, and has the potential to usurp the market from the first product.182  
Thus, follow-on drugs are attractive from the market perspective, but they typically provide only 
a marginal medical benefit.  The reward systems in both the HIF and the MIPFA were 
specifically designed to correct this misalignment of incentives between private developers and 
public health.183  The possibility of antimicrobial resistance, however, makes antibiotics different 
from other drugs:  a follow-on antibiotic can still have significant therapeutic value as long as it 
is not susceptible to the same mechanism of resistance that thwarted the effectiveness of the first-
in-class drug.  In recognition of this issue, the MIPFA required that the “expected life cycle 
benefits” of a new antibiotic be taken into account when determining the size of the reward.184   
C.  FEATURES OF PHASE TWO 
1.  Production and sales options.   
The emphasis of phase two of the UADS model is on the public health goal of preserving 
an effective antibiotic supply.  In contrast to the HIF and MIPFA, which seek to improve access 
to new medicines, the UADS model strives to constrain access to antibiotics to curb 
                                                 
181 HOLLIS & POGGE, supra note 118, at 4. 
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inappropriate uses.  Because antibiotics are a common pool resource, regulation of their 
production and use is necessary to ensure that the resource is available for future generations.185  
Although patent-based mechanisms for conservation of antibiotics have been proposed, these 
models do not resolve the fundamental tension between the incentive to conserve an antibiotic 
and the motivation to sell it to maximize profit.  Thus, the UADS model places the responsibility 
for regulating antibiotic production and sales into the hands of the government. 
 Direct distribution by government.   
One mechanism for government regulation of antibiotic manufacture and sales is to charge the 
government with these responsibilities directly.  Although this option assures governmental 
control of antibiotic supply, it has several disadvantages.  First, it requires the creation of 
substantial new governmental bodies that make, test, and distribute drugs.  Not only does this 
increase the cost of the program, it raises questions about the government’s experience and 
expertise in an area in which the private sector excels.186  Second, transferring antibiotic 
production and sales to government bodies would have an immediate adverse impact on 
companies that currently engage in these activities.  The legislative and administrative changes 
required to implement such a system would therefore likely meet strong opposition by the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
 License to drug manufacturers.   
A more moderate approach to regulate antibiotic manufacture and sales is for the 
government to grant licenses to drug companies.  Whereas previously-proposed patent prize 
systems seek to buy private patent rights to place the inventions (i.e., drugs) in the public 
domain, here the government exercises its patent rights as would a private patent holder.  In this 
system, the government could issue a revocable license to produce and sell a new antibiotic and 
                                                 
185 For discussion of antibiotics as a common pool resource, see, LAXMINARAYAN & MALANI, supra note 160; 
Kades, supra note 24; Outterson et al., supra note 33, at 562; Kevin Outterson, The Vanishing Public Domain: 
Antibiotic Resistance, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Intellectual Property Law, 67 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 67, 78-80 
(2005). 
186 Power, supra note 46, at 30. 
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make the license contingent on meeting certain regulatory requirements.  A licensing system 
takes advantage of the efficiency and experience of drug producers and does not require the 
establishment of an entirely new governmental workforce.  The legislative and administrative 
changes needed to implement a licensing system would be less drastic than those required for a 
direct-distribution system.  Moreover, the pharmaceutical industry would be more favorably 
inclined toward such a system for a few reasons.  First, a bill proposing such a system would 
have little impact on this sector because few companies currently engage in antibiotic 
development.  Second, the possibility of licensing antibiotics from the government for 
manufacture would create future business opportunities for this sector. 
2.  Reimbursement.   
A complementary mechanism of phase two of the UADS model is the use of 
reimbursement by public payers to regulate antibiotic use.  The Antibiotic Continued 
Effectiveness (ACE) Program proposed by one group of commentators recommends using 
reimbursement to control antibiotic use in two ways:  increasing payments to provide a stronger 
incentive for private drug developers who retain patent rights, and making these payments 
conditional on meeting conservation goals to promote antibiotic stewardship.187  Although these 
policy levers would operate differently in the absence of private patent rights, they are still 
applicable in the UADS model.  The critical point is that public reimbursement for antibiotics is 
well below the social value that these drugs provide, so raising payment levels is still efficient if 
it can achieve some other public health goal.188  In the UADS model, public payers such as 
Medicare and Medicaid would substantially reimburse providers for acceptable uses of 
antibiotics but not at all for inappropriate uses.  The combination of high prices and selective 
reimbursement discourages low-value uses of antibiotics, such as prescriptions for undiagnosed 
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infections that are likely to be viral rather than bacterial.189  In contrast to the ACE Program, 
which allows higher antibiotic prices to incentivize development of new antibiotics, the UADS 
model employs them to deter undesirable uses.  Thus, the UADS model uses a licensing system 
to regulate antibiotic supply and reimbursement to control antibiotic demand. 
3.  Antibiotic stewardship.   
A third feature of phase two of the UADS model is the requirement of a government 
body to oversee antibiotic stewardship.  The Strategies to Address Antimicrobial Resistance 
(STAAR) Act, a bill proposed by Representative Jim Matheson in 2009, provides for the 
establishment of an administrative body to perform this function.190  The STAAR Act calls for 
the creation of an Antimicrobial Resistance Office (ARO) within the Department of Health and 
Human Services.191  Under the STAAR Act, the ARO would seek guidance from a Public Health 
Antimicrobial Advisory Board (PHAAB) made up of infectious diseases and public health 
experts.192  The STAAR Act charges these groups with monitoring antibiotic supply through the 
collection of data on antibiotic use and surveillance of antibiotic resistance.193  Although not part 
of the 2009 STAAR Act, another duty that the ARO could assume is the establishment of a 
strategic antibiotic reserve (SAR).  Creation of a SAR has been described previously as a 
component of Project Bioshield and the ACE program.194  The SAR would include a supply of 
broad-spectrum or high-potency antibiotics to be used only when front-line antibiotics have lost 
their effectiveness.195 
D.  SUPPLEMENTAL MECHANISMS COMPATIBLE WITH UADS MODEL 
 Although the core features of the UADS model are described in Parts III.A to III.C, 
                                                 
189 By one estimate, half of all antibiotic prescriptions for non-hospitalized patients are for infections caused by 
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implementation of the UADS model does not preclude adoption of other measures to promote 
antibiotic development and conservation.  The patent buyout in phase one of the UADS model is 
a pull incentive.  Many commentators, however, advocate models that incorporate both push and 
pull incentives to promote drug development.196  Several of the push incentives discussed in Part 
II can be implemented in conjunction with the UADS model because they operate upstream in 
the development process.  Regulatory mechanisms such as tax credits, expedited review, and a 
streamlined review process can work in concert with the patent buyout in phase one to promote 
antibiotic development.  Some contractual arrangements, e.g., direct funding of research and 
early-stage research collaborations, would also facilitate antibiotic development in phase one of 
the UADS model.  Thus, the combination of the UADS patent prize with one or more push 
incentives could produce a more balanced and effective system to stimulate antibiotic 
innovation. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 Leaders in the medical, scientific, business, and pharmaceutical communities have 
recognized the need to act to ensure the continued supply of effective antibiotics.  Antibiotics are 
vital to modern medicine, but they may become extinct if current trends in drug development and 
sales continue.  One problem is that the patent system provides an inadequate incentive for the 
development of new antibiotics because they are less profitable than other drugs.  This 
predicament has stirred much discussion in the context of medicines for neglected diseases, and 
analysts have proposed a variety of solutions that entail changes to the current patent system.  A 
second problem, which the patent system cannot solve, is that antibiotics eventually lose their 
effectiveness due to resistance.  This challenge requires a public commitment to conservation.  
As one group of commentators puts it, the crux of the growing antibiotic crisis is that “[p]ublic 
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health goals and the goals of the private actors—primarily pharmaceutical manufacturers—are 
woefully misaligned.”197 
The UADS model described here would resolve the tension between the public health 
goals and private interests.  The UADS model uncouples the public health goals of antibiotic 
development and antibiotic conservation so that they are no longer in conflict.  Phase one of the 
UADS model provides incentive to biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies to develop 
new antibiotics, as they have done successfully in the past when the reward was sufficiently 
large.  The prize awarded to developers of new antibiotics removes the incentive on these private 
actors to engage in activity contrary to public health goals.  Phase two of the UADS model 
allows both drug companies and the government to fulfill their respective missions:  for the 
companies, making and selling antibiotics as efficiently as possible; and for the government, 
regulating distribution of antibiotics to balance current and future medical needs.  Additionally, 
by using a licensing system in phase two, the UADS model requires minimal infrastructural 
change in the government.  The UADS model eliminates the institutional conflicts inherent in the 
current patent system yet has the flexibility to accommodate other mechanisms that promote 
antibiotic development and conservation.  By re-aligning private incentives with public health 
goals, the UADS model will allow future generations to enjoy the myriad health benefits that 
antibiotics have let many of us take for granted. 
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